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Abstract—A popular application of ambient intelligence sys-
tems constitutes of assisting living services on smart buildings.
As intelligence is imported in embedded equipment, the system
becomes able to provide smart services (e.g. control lights, air-
conditioning, provide energy management services etc.). IoT is the
main enabler of such environments. However, the interconnection
of these cyber-physical systems and the processing of personal
data raise serious security and privacy issues. In this paper
we present a framework that can guarantee Security, Privacy,
Dependability and Interoperability (SPDI) in IoT. Taking advan-
tage of the underlying IoT deployment, the proposed framework
not only implements the requested smart functionality but also
provide modelling and administration that can guarantee those
SPDI properties. Moreover, we provide an application example
of the framework in a smart building scenario.
Index Terms—security, privacy, dependability, interoperability,
IoT
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of things (IoT) applications and their enabling plat-
forms are often vulnerable to security attacks. IoT applications
operating and context conditions changes can compromise
their security [1]. They can also generate, make use of, and
inter-relate massive personal data in ways that can potentially
breach legal and privacy requirements [1]. In the context of the
ever-evolving IoT threat landscape [2], preserving security and
privacy properties remains a particularly challenging problem,
due to the difficulty in:
• analysing vulnerabilities in the complex end-to-end com-
positions of heterogeneous smart objects
• selecting appropriate controls (e.g. different schemes for
ID and key management, different encryption mech-
anisms), for smart objects with heterogeneous re-
sources/constraints [3], [4]
• preserving end-to-end security and privacy under dy-
namic changes in IoT applications and security incidents
The above challenges give rise to significant complexities,
and relate to the implementation and deployment of IoT
applications with embedded intelligence across all layers, as
indicated in Fig.1. To address those challenges we propose a
pattern-driven framework, built upon existing IoT platforms,
Fig. 1. IoT challenges - Embedded cross-layer intelligence
able to enable and guarantee secure and dependable actuation
and semi-autonomic behaviour in both IoT and Industrial IoT
(IIoT) applications. The approach followed in the proposed
work is inspired by the work carried out in SEMIoTICS, a
horizon 2020 project.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents an overview of the related work and how the
proposed framework extends their current state of the art.
Section III describes the vision and ambition in deploying
a fully re-configurable framework. Section IV explains the
system level design of the framework in an smart building
use case. Finally, section V summarises the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Patterns and SPDI
Patterns are reusable solutions to common problems and
building blocks to architectures. In our approach, patterns en-
code proven dependencies between Security, Privacy, Depend-
ability and Interoperability (SPDI) properties of individual
smart objects and corresponding properties of orchestrations
(composition) involving them. The encoding of such depen-
dencies enables:
• the verification that a smart object orchestration satisfies
certain SPDI properties
• the generation (and adaptation) of orchestrations in ways
that are guaranteed to satisfy required SPDI properties.
Our approach to patterns is inspired from similar pattern-based
approaches used in service-oriented systems [5], [6] , cyber
physical systems [7], [9], and networks [8], [10]–[12], [15].
An emerging approach to securing software systems, known
as ”security-by-design”, aims to guarantee system-wide secu-
rity properties by virtue of the design of software systems.
Sectet [13], for instance, supports the design of orchestrations
of software system components and services as UML message
charts and converts them into workflows after wrapping ser-
vices within components enforcing security properties, known
as Policy Enforcement Points. PWSSec [14], uses security
architectural patterns to convert security requirements into
specifications of service-oriented architectures that make use
of external security services providing required security func-
tionalities. A key capability required in security-by-design is
the ability to verify the desired security properties as part of
the design process. Verification has often been model-based
[16]–[18]. Model based approaches verify the satisfiability of
the properties based on model checking [19], [20]. In these
approaches, software component and service compositions are
modelled using formal languages and the required security
properties are expressed as properties on the model [21].
Other approaches focus on software service workflows using
business process modelling languages (e.g., Sec-MoSC [22])
Pino et al [23] use secure service orchestration (SSO) patterns
to support the design of service workflows with required
security properties.Their approach uses pattern-based analysis
to verify security properties, avoiding full model checking that
is computationally expensive and non-scalable to large system.
Other model-based approaches (e.g., [23], [24]) support the
transformation of security requirements to code. In [25], the
authors present a practical and easy to use methodology to
measure security, privacy and dependability.
III. VISION AND AMBITION
In this work, we are presenting a dynamically configurable
and evolvable framework to enable: (a) the integration of
heterogeneous smart objects that are available through het-
erogeneous IoT platforms into IoT applications in a manner
that is scalable, secure, privacy preserving and dependable; (b)
the provision of multi-layer intelligence capabilities enabling
semi-autonomic smart object behaviour and evolution; and
(c) the runtime management and adaptation of these objects
and the IoT applications that they form to preserve security,
privacy, and dependability.
Figure 2 shows our initial vision of the initial logical
architecture of the SEMIoTICS framework, which motivated
the work presented herein, as defined at the start of the
project, and how it relates to smart objects, IoT applications,
and existing IoT platforms, and how this architecture maps
Fig. 2. Framework Architecture
onto a generic deployment infrastructure consisting of private
and public clouds, networks, and field devices. Within the
figure, blue boxes show components of the framework that
are to be developed; white boxes indicate components of
IoT applications managed by the framework. The key role
of our framework in the IIoT/IoT implementation stack is to
support the secure, dependable and privacy-preserving con-
nectivity and interoperability of IoT applications and smart
objects used by them, and the management, monitoring and
adaptation of these applications, objects and their connectivity.
Our framework will support cross-layer intelligent dynamic
adaptation, including heterogeneous smart objects, networks
and clouds. To address the complexity and scalability needs
within horizontal and vertical domains, we will develop and
integrate smart programmable networking and semantic in-
teroperability mechanisms leveraged by a Software Defined
Networking (SDN) deployment [26], [27].
The key element enabling our approach is the use of
architectural SPDI patterns. These patterns define generic ways
of composing (i.e., establishing the connectivity between)
and configuring the heterogeneous smart objects and software
components that may exist at all layers of the IoT applications
implementation stack, including: sensors and actuators; smart
devices; software components at the network, cloud, IoT
enabling platforms and/or other middleware layer; as well as
software components at the IoT application layer. To do so,
patterns specify abstract and generic smart object interaction
and orchestration protocols, enhanced (if necessary) by trans-
formations to ensure the semantic compatibility of data.
Furthermore (and more importantly), the smart object in-
teraction and orchestration protocols encoded by the patterns
must have proven ability (i.e., an ability proven through formal
verification or demonstrated through testing and/or operational
evidence) to achieve not only a semantically viable interoper-
ability between the smart objects that they compose but also
specific security, privacy, dependability and interoperability
(SPDI) properties, which may be required of compositions.
The compositions defined by patterns are both vertical and
horizontal, i.e., they can involve smart objects at the same
(horizontal) or different layers (vertical) layer of the IoT
implementation stack.
As an example of a pattern that guarantees ”data integrity”
i.e., absence of unauthorized modifications of data consider
the integrity preserving cascade composition pattern discussed
in [28]. According to this pattern in a sequential composition
of processes P1,. . . ,Pn where the input data of Pi are meant to
be the output data of Pi-1, and the communication between Pi-1
to Pi (i=2. . . n) is based on an orchestrator O which facilitates
data transfers from Pi-1 to Pi, overall data integrity is preserved
if data integrity is preserved within each Pi, within O and
across all communications from Pis to O and vice versa.
The integrity cascade composition pattern applies both to
horizontal compositions (e.g., in software services workflows
as in [28]) and vertical composition (e.g., in transfer of data
in invocation of operations of IoT enabling middleware) [29].
Another (more complex) example of a pattern fitting our
vision is the Synchronously Controlled Distribution Line
(SCDL) pattern discussed in [7]. SCDL guarantees that a dis-
tributed asynchronous sensor system installed upon a physical
pipeline (e.g., a pipeline of an electricity distribution network)
will operate in virtual synchrony and provide a guaranteed
density of readings (i.e., a bounded minimum number of
readings per distant and per time unit). The application of
the SCDL pattern is proven to guarantee the consumption of
readings at the end of the reading interval where they fit, make
them available in a synchronous manner, filter out illegitimate
readings and produce readings of the required density for the
pipeline. In SCDL pattern, these properties are guaranteed
even in the presence of missing or corrupted raw data, as long
as there is a minimal number of legitimate sensor readings.
Examples of additional patterns have been given in [5] and
[12], [15]. These include patterns for confidentiality in service
orchestrations and patterns for availability in Software Defined
Networks, respectively.
Inspired by these earlier works, we will define patterns
specifying:
• Composition structures for integrating smart objects and
components of IoT enabling platforms in a manner that
guarantees SPDI properties.
• The end-to-end SPDI properties that the compositions
expressed by the pattern preserve.
• The component level SPDI properties that the types of
smart objects and/or components orchestrated by the
pattern, must satisfy in order to preserve the end-to-end
SPD properties.
• Additional conditions that need to be satisfied for guar-
anteeing end-to-end SPDI properties. These may, for
example, include configuration conditions that need to
be satisfied by the IoT platforms and the networks pro-
viding the connectivity between them, for guaranteeing
the end-to-end availability properties of IoT application
(composition).
• Monitoring checks that must be monitored at runtime in
order to verify that any assumptions about the individual
smart objects and components that are orchestrated by a
pattern or other operational conditions, which are critical
for the preservation of the end-to-end SPDI properties of
the pattern, hold at runtime.
• Adaptation actions that may be undertaken to adapt IoT
applications, which realise the composition structure of
the pattern, at runtime. Such actions may, for example,
include the replacement of individual smart objects within
a composition; the adaptation of the process realizing the
composition; the modification of the configuration of the
network services used to connect the smart objects of
the composition and/or the deployment platforms upon
which these objects run. Adaptation actions are specified
along with guard conditions determining when they can
be executed (guards are monitored and adaptation is
triggered when they are satisfied).
It should be noted that the final framework solution will
also include a generic engine (i.e., Smart Object Manager in
Figure 2) supporting the execution of patterns at runtime to
realize the overall process of monitoring, forming, adapting
and managing smart object orchestrations in IoT applications.
The system can be configured at runtime in order to retain
the desirable SPDI goals [30]. This operation is important, es-
pecially in cases of cyber-attacks. Intrusion detection systems
[31] discover ongoing attempts to infiltrate the smart building
infrastructure and alert the involved components. Then, the
SPDI controller (placed in the SDN controller) is able to alter
the system architecture automatically, based on pre-defined
strategies, and enhance protection. Also, a remote management
service enables the system administrator to change the system
manually and update the reaction plans based on the latest
security guidelines (i.e. made by CERTs).
Thus, the users would consume safely the deployed services.
In case of attack, their security will be retained and the
personal data will be safeguarded as the defined SPDI patterns
guarantee the principles of ”E2E protection”.
IV. SMART HOME SCENARIO
The application of the proposed SPDI patterns in a smart
building scenario is depicted in Figure 3. In this scenario, an
SDN controller maintains in the Knowledge Base (KB) the
core SPDI properties for every individual component of the
underlying subsystem. Then, the controller estimates the status
of the entire system (Smart objects, Services, Applications
etc.). This way the controller can permit/block composition
activities, or even can change configurations at runtime in
order to comply with the designed SPDI properties. As
aforementioned, the administrator can also perform the same
functionality through a remote management service and update
the controller’s reactive strategies.
Figure 4 describes the sequence of events for an incident
response when a cyber-attack is performed (e.g. unauthorized
access attempt). Once a threat is identified, an Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) raises an internal alarm to inform
Fig. 3. Smart Building Use Case
the involved system components, which is then taken into
account during the response phase, and counters the attack
automatically. The administrator is notified for the incident
and, after data analysis, and reports the event to the responsible
Computer Emergency Report Team (CERT). The CERT per-
forms thorough analysis and disseminates the new guidelines
for mitigating such attacks to the relevant action team. The
team updates the response policy and the administrator deploys
the new SPDI patterns to the SDN controller, which adapts the
system to the new state. The reactive plan should constrain
the effects of the attack or even counter it, while preserving
the desired SPDI goals. The produced data of the incident
response phase (e.g. triggering events, taken actions) are
maintained in the knowledge base for feedback and reference
point of future similar events.
A. Technical aspects
The technical aspects of the use case includes the actors,
information exchanged between them and also some assump-
tions and preconditions that apply to the presented smart
building showcase. The main actors of the framework and their
responsibilities are the following:
• SDN Controller: monitors the network traffic and man-
ages the underlying components based on SPDI goals.
The controller enforces strategies for ensuring specific
SPDI patterns and achieves E2E properties. In case of
attack, the controller automatically configures the system
at runtime to preserve protection and an adequate SPDI
level.
• Administrators: monitor and manage the system, detect
anomalies, and control incidents. When a security inci-
dent occurs, administrators can forward it to the Com-
puter Emergency Report Team (CERT) which is capable
in following specific strategies and multi-level security
response.
• CERTs: cooperate with Internet service providers, ICT
vendors, and government agencies, and provide several
services to their member and the public, including: i)
collection and dissemination of information related to
computer security, ii) raising of information security
awareness, iii) in depth analysis of security incidents, iv)
event handling and response, v) collaboration with other
CERTs.
• Action Teams: handle security incidents that are reported
by a CERT. Among others, they also: i) install mecha-
nisms for filtering the network traffic, ii) detect intrusion
actions in the system, iii) perform actions for protecting
Fig. 4. Incidence Report Sequence
the system threatened/affected by malicious activity, iv)
patch the system, v) restore affected systems, vi) offer
solutions from related advisories and alerts vii) deploy
other response policies.
• End Users
For the demonstrated use case, some assumptions are made.
First of all, all SPDI properties of every framework’s com-
ponent are evaluated during the design phase. Moreover an
incident strategy describing how information is passed and the
action to be taken during an attack should be deployed. Also
the response of the CERTs during an attack not only contains
the procedure of activities to be taken but also defines the
new SPDI perspectives maintananse policy. Furthermore, it is
assumed that the framework is able to monitor and collect
cyber data from the components such as security logs and
system and file integrity information. Also the reported data
from the sensory equipment such as critical alerts must be
available for analysis from the framework in order to ensure
SPDI levels.
Data exchanged between actors should be secured. The
IDS produces an automated event monitoring capture report
and the information transfer methods between IDS and SDN
Controller are determined by the capabilities of the device
that run the IDS. They may include: VPN, HTTPS, FTPS,
FTP over SSH, IPSec, and SFTP. Furthermore as presented at
[32] all sensors can send their traffic through secure channels.
As aforementioned controller automatically processes the data
and classify the incident based on pre-established mechanisms
and the Knowledge Base that securely maintains the previously
detected events. Then the administrator is notified respectively
and logins to the system to access the stored information.
The administrator logs in the CERTs incident handling system
through an HTTPS session and the event is recorded and
forwarded for further process by the CERT experts.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a framework that adopts a pattern-
based approach to guarantee SPDI properties across horizontal
and vertical compositional structures of IoT applications. SPDI
patterns in this approach set necessary and sufficient conditions
not only for composing different components within IoT
applications in ways that guarantee SPDI properties, but also
for ensuring that IoT applications will use the framework in
ways that guarantee such properties. The used SPDI patterns
extend existing work on patterns by covering in an integrated
manner not only security, but also dependability, privacy,
and interoperability properties focusing on IoT systems and
applications. A smart building application of the proposed
framework is also presented.
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